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Stalemate and Apathy in Poland
 
By DAVID S. MASON 
AssociaU Professor ofPolili£al Seima, BUll" UnivtTSiO' 
FOR Polish society, the last five years have been, in tum, exhilarating, chaotic and depressing. I The dockworkers' and miners' strikes ofAugust, 1980, 
forced the government to sign the Gdansk Agreements, 
the first of which allowed the formation of the indepen­
d~nt self-governing trade union Solidarity. During the 16 
months of Solidarity's legal existence, Poland had the 
most democratic environment in its postwar history. 
General Wojciech Jaruzelski, Poland's Prime Minister 
and party leader, brought this to an end with the declara­
tion of martial law on December 13, 1981. Martial law 
was formally lifted in july, 1983, and most ofthe interned 
Solidarity leaders were released in july, 1984. But many 
martial law restrictions were continued, and Poland re­
mains a society that is sullen, pessimistic and divided. 
Solidarity'S impact on Poland was remarkable. The 
union attracted some nine million members-one-third 
ofPoland's adult population. The universal appeal ofthis 
independent, free-spirited organization extended into the 
Polish United Workers party (Poland's Communist par­
ty), one-third of whose members joined Solidarity. The 
openness of political debate in Solidarity forced a demo­
cratization ofvirtually every other institution in the coun­
try, including the party. The flood of independent pub­
lications issued by Solidarity groups opened the official 
press and led to the implementatiol: of a new and vastly 
more liberal law on censorship. Solidarity'S popularity, 
its programs, and its charismatic leader. tech Walesa, 
forced the party and the government to cc.mpetl: for the 
people's allegiance. 
Thus, during 1981, the regime conceded a number of 
popular issues: legalizing Solidarity and its right to strike; 
allowing the Sunday radio broadcast of Roman Catholic 
mass; granting work-free Saturdays and dramatic in­
creases in wages; and permitting Solidarity to publish its 
own national weekly newspaper, Tygodnik SolidaT7WSC. 
New legislation provided greater autonomy for universi­
ties, decentralized economic refonn, and established a 
system ofenterprise self-management in which the work-
IThe author would like to thank Robert Sharlet and David 
Ost for their helpful comments "nd suggestions on this article. 
'For an excellent account ofthe Solidarity experience and the 
early months of martial law, see Timothy Garton Ash, 17It 
Polish RnJolution: SoIid4rig (New York: Scribner'., 1984). 
ers would share in the governance of the workplace and 
select its director. 
There was, however, a dark side to these concessions. 
The relationship between Solidarity and the regime was 
bitter, distrustful and conflict-prone; neither side ad· 
justed to the compromise necessary for democracy. Soli­
darity accused the government ofreneging on the Gdansk 
Agreements (it remains a popular myth in Poland that 
the government never implemented any of the 21 de­
mands). Not trusting the government to accede to its 
demands through negotiation, Solidarity often resorted to 
the only tactic that had brought results: strikes, or the 
threat of strikes. 
The regime, on the other hand, claimed that Solidarity 
had exceeded the boundaries set in August, 1980, making 
demands that were more political than economic and 
threatening the constitutional principle of the "leading 
role of the party." To complicate matters further, the 
Polish economy continued the nose dive that began in 
1979, ca using serious shortages of basic products like 
bn:ad. All this contributed to the crisis atmosphere oflate 
19t31. When jaruzelski declared a "state of war" (there 
was no provision in the Polish constitution for martial 
law), he claimed that he did so in sorrow; Poland was "on 
the edge of the abyss" and his action was necessary to 
save the country from civil war and chaos.2 
The speed and effectiveness of the crackdown were 
extraordinary. Several thousand Solidarity leaders and 
activists were "interned" and others went into hiding. 
The flood ofSolidarity publications, banners, posters and 
buttons disappeared, declared illegal by the military au­
thorities. All organizations, demonstrations and assem­
blies (except religious ones) were temporarily banned. 
The regime imposed a curfew, put restrictions on travel, 
and blacked out communications. The spontaneous 
strikes and demonstrations launched by workers and 
miners were starved out or broken up, often violently, by 
"lOMO," the motorized riot police. 
jaruzelski's professed task during this period was "nor­
malization" with the promise of a continuation of the 
process of"renewal" begun in 1981. The apparent stabi­
lization led the regime graduaUy to relax the restrictions 
of martial law, while formaUy eliminating the new and 
reformed institutions and weakening the laws that 
emerged in 1981. In October, 1982, Solidarity was for­
mally banned, with a law providing for the establishment 
of new unions. In November, Walesa was released from 
internment and allowed to return to work in the Gdansk 
shipyards. In July, 1983, martial law was lifted, though 
many of its restrictions remained in force. InJuly, 1983, 
and inJuly, 1984, the regime proclaimed an amnesty for 
Solidarity activists under arrest or in hiding. 
While the regime may claim some success with "nor­
malization" in the two years since the lifting of martial 
law, and while it may claim to be on the road to economic 
recovery and political renewal, in reality the situation is 
less rosy and more complex. Popular defiance and open 
resistance may not be so prevalent as they were two years 
ago, but the regime has not been able to achieve the 
legitimacy it desires, nor has it mobilized the population 
toward its economic and political goals. 
THE REGIME'S EFFORTS AT "NORMALIZAll0N" 
When martial law was lifted, Prime MinisterJaruzel­
ski told the Sejm (the Polish Parliament): 
Our intentions are sincere. They are demonstrated by the 
implementation ofsocialist renewal. They are confirmed by 
the democratization or social life, the strengthening of the 
position of the working class, the rebirth of the trade union 
movement, the development of the class-based, indepen­
dent and self-governing trade unions, by the consolidation 
of the practice of seeking advice and consultation, and by 
the far· reaching economic reform. 
At the same time, he asserted that "anarchy will not 
return to Poland. Efforts to undertake antistate activity 
will be repressed no less resolutely than during martial 
law.,,3 These words exemplify the two-track policy the 
regime has followed: efforts to elicit controlled participa­
tion, advice and support, and forceful suppression of 
dissent and underground activity. Neither track has been 
entirely successful. 
In its effort to channel and control the participatory 
spirit bred by Solidarity, the regime has dissolved most of 
the old institutional structures and has created new ones 
under the party's supervision. As might be expected, 
none of these has generated the enthusiasm or participa­
tion that Solidarity enjoyed. The regime-sponsored Patri­
otic Committee for National Rebirth (PRON), estab­
lished inJuly, 1982, was to act as a coalition of all social 
forces, but it has attracted little interest or support. It is 
widely and openly criticized for not reflecting public 
needs.+ 
New regime-sponsored organizations for artists, writ­
3Wojciechjaruzelski, PT{OTlOWimia /983 (Warsaw: Ksiazka i 
Wiedza, 1984), pp. 167-168. 
·See, for example, the roundtable discussion titled "An At­
tempt at Dialogue," in Polivk4,january 5,1985; translated in 
joint Publications Research Service, East Eruopt Report, no. 
85/27 (February 28, 1985). 
~Try6uNJ Wu, April 27, 1984. 
6For the draft of the new legislation, see "Ustawa 0 zwiaz­
leach zawodowych," Zwi~wi«. May, 1985. 
ers,journalists and students have bttn unable to recruit 
as many members as their more independent predeces­
sors. The new Polish Students' Association, for example, 
has enrolled only about 10 percent of all students. These 
new organizations find it difficult to attract members 
partly because ofa continuing Solidarity-sponsored boy­
cott of all "official" organizations. 
The regime's main hope seems to lie with the reconsti­
tuted trade unions. These organizations, as defined by the 
law of October, 1982, were to be "independent" and 
"self-governing" (terms used to describe Solidarity) and 
were to have the right to strike, which pre-Solidarity 
unions had not had. But they are limited by a number of 
restrictions. At first, they could exist only at the factory 
level, not at the regional or nationallevelsj when they did 
expand, "they were organized by branch of industry, 
rather than region, as Solidarity had bttn; and, most 
critically, there was only one union organization in each 
enterprise until 1985, though this restriction has been 
repeatedly extended. 
Despite a Solidarity boycott, the new unions now num­
ber about five million members, considerably fewer than 
the Solidarity or the pre-1980 union members but prob­
ably more than either Solidarity or the regime expected. 
In fact, a number ofsurveys show that about one-third of 
the new members are former members of Solidarity. 
Most workers, however, have adopted a "wait and see" 
attitude toward the new unions, and so far they have not 
seen very much. The new unions have been short on both 
resources and legitimacy, and they have bttn visible 
mostly in complaints about price increases. In the spring 
of 1984, national union officials publicly complained that 
government decisions on price increases had bttn taken 
"without any consultation with the trade unions.,,5 In 
1985, the government actually scaled down price in­
creases, ostensibly in response to union complaints. 
To boost the visibility and attractiveness of the new 
unions and to create central organizations with which the 
government could "consult," the government allowed 
accelerated development of national union structures, 
culminating in the establishment of a centralized Trade 
Unions' National Agreement (OPZZ) in November, 
1984. And in July, 1985, the Sejm passed an updated 
trade union law that strengthened the factory-level 
unions by granting them responsibility for all employees 
(not just union members) and extending their responsi­
bilities, especially in the area ofsocial welfare.6While this 
may have been helpful for the new unions, it struck a . 
double blow at Solidarity: the new legislation extends the 
ban on multiple unions in a workplace, frustrating Soli­
darity's demands for trade union pluralism, and it trans­
fers to the unions some of the functions held by enterprise 
self-management councils, where many Solidarity sup­
porters had directed their support. 
In many ways, the trade union issue illustrates the 
wider dilemmas and paradoxes of post-martial law Po­
land. A strong and vocal minority, including the most 
active Solidarity supporters, refuses to support the new 
structures and brands those who do as collaborators or 
opportunists. On the other hand, many Poles believe that 
the unions provide the only real opportunity to defend the 
interests of the workers, given domestic and "geopoliti­
cal" realities. 7 A broad middle group refuses to identifY 
with either position, preferring to "wait and see" or sim­
ply to tum away from public and societal affairs 
altogether. This roughly equal tripartite division has par­
alyzed Polish society, making it impossible for either the 
regime or the opposition to muster enough support to 
carry through its programs. 
The regime has used other methods to pursue "nor­
malization," but these too have had mixed results. In 
June, 1984, the government staged elections to the local 
and regional people's councils. There were two candi­
dates for each position, and voters could reject the first in 
favor of the second candidate. Solidarity's underground 
Interim Coordinating Committee (TKK) called for a 
boycott of the elections and arranged for Solidarity sup­
porters to monitor polling places for an accurate reading 
of the turnout. 
The final results allowed both sides to claim a victory. 
The government claimed a 75 percent turnout which, in 
government spokesman Jerzy Urban's words, showed 
"that the public supports stabilization, peace and social­
ist development in Poland."s Solidarity said the govern­
ment's figures were inflated by between 12 and 15 per­
cent, meaning that some 10.5 million people boycotted 
the e1ections-a victory for the banned union. 
In an effort to portray an atmosphere of stability and 
nonnalization and to assuage Western governments, the 
government proclaimed major amnesty programs on the 
official national holiday ofJuly 22 in both 1983 and 1984. 
The 1983 amnesty was broader, covering "almost 3,700 
people guilty of political offenses, and over 1,100 who 
turned themselves in of their own accord,"9 but it did not 
include the most important opposition leaders. The 1984 
amnesty did. According to official figures, of652 political 
prisoners, 630 were freed; included were 7 members of 
Solidarity's National Commission and 4 prominent 
members of KOR, the Workers' Defense· Committee. 
Since the amnesty, some ofthese people have been arrest­
ed again; nevertheless, the amnesty presented a paradoxi­
cal situation: an authoritarian Communist state freeing 
its most prominent opponents. 
7This is the Aesopian term used in both the official and 
unofficial press to describe the constraints on Polish action 
im~sed by the Soviet Union. 
IktcqJospolilll, June 18, 1984. 
9qrie WllTs{awy, July 24, 1984. 
IOFor example, Lawrence Weschler, "Poland: Three Years 
After," HllTpers, December, 1984, p. 18. and Marian Kostecki 
and Knysztof Mrda, "Collective Solidarity in Poland's Pow­
dered Society," 1h Insurgent Sociologist, vol. 12, nos. 1-2 (1984). 
IISolidarity poll reported in Stowo POtkinnne, May 27, 1984; 
cited in Radio Free Europe Research (hereafter RFER), "Pol­
ish Situation Report,"January 23, J985. Official polJ in Potit". 
.la, July 27, 1985, p. 6. 
This is not to say that theJaruzelski regime has relied 
only on the carrot. The authorities have periodically 
cracked down on those who strike, demonstrate, publish 
illegally, or plan these activities. On February 13, 1985, 
police broke up a Gdansk meeting ofopposition activists 
organized by Lech Walesa. Walesa was subsequently 
ordered not to leave Gdansk without prior pennission 
from the police. Three of his colleagues, Wladyslaw 
Frasyniuk, Bogdan Lis, and Adam Michnik, were arrest­
ed and tried for planning a strike (which never took 
place), and each was sentenced to two to three years 
imprisonment. 
The authorities have also attempted to rein in the 
country's intellectuals and the universities which, even 
under martial law, had been among the most outspoken 
and autonomous in East Europe. In April, 1985, for 
example, history professor and Solidarity adviser Bronis­
law Geremek was dismissed from the prestigious Acad­
emy of Sciences apparently for public lectures critical of 
the Polish government and its relationship to the Soviet 
Union. The universities have also been subject to in­
creased pressure. In July, 1985, the Sejm passed a new 
law on higher education restricting the autonomy of the 
universities, over the objections of the the university sen­
ate and a number of government advisory commissions. 
THE PULVERIZED SOCIETY 
In the short term, the regime probably does not need 
to worry about another round of insurgency. After the 
excitement and disruptions of 1980 and 1981, the depres­
sion of 1982, and the economic hardships of the last five 
years, many Poles are apathetic and withdrawn from 
public life. The apathy and hopelessness are heightened 
by the loss of the sense of"solidarity" that characterized 
the early months after the Gdansk strikes. While most 
Poles objected to martial law, some did support it and 
only a minority of the population now backs the protest 
activities of the Solidarity underground. 
Most Solidarity supporters and many writers10 suggest 
that the regime has deliberately promoted this sense of 
hopelessness and division in Polish society because it is 
the best protection against rebellion. Whether or not this 
is true, apathy and privatism are typical ofsocieties that 
have just been through great upheavals; people tum to 
personal and family matters for a sense ofreliefand calm. 
The sense ofdespair is as much a result ofeconomic as 
political factors. Both official and underground public 
opinion polls show that the overwhelming majority of 
Poles think that the government's policies will not end the 
economic crisis and that the economy will deteriorate 
even further. t I Other polls show that while almost every­
one blames the party and government for the "current 
crisis," many also blame "the political opposition." In 
fact, both public opinion polls and conversations with 
Poles reveal that the only institution in Poland with 
widespread support is the Church. Even among Solidar­
ity activists, "the underground opposition" is rated favor­
ably by a bare majority (54.6 percent) of the respondents, 
while the Church is at the top of the list with 74.5 
percent. 17 As usual in these polls, the Polish United 
Workers' party is at or near the bottom of these lists, and 
other official institutions fare almost as badly. 
Frustration, apathy and alienation are particularly evi­
dent among the young, who constitute about half the 
population and who were the driving force behind Soli­
darity. A report by the Primate's Social Council on the 
Situation ofYoung People found "an overwhelming and 
increasing passivity on the part of most young people 
who, tonnented by futile anger, tum away from the 
pressure of schools and organizations and seek refuge in 
individualism and in the passivity and exclusiveness of 
small groups of friends."13 This report also noted the 
increased incidence of religious belief among young pe0­
ple and the increasing support for the Church as both a 
moral and a political authority. 
Even official publications admit that young people 
have little confidence in "new sociopolitical institutions," 
do not participate in officially sponsored organizations, 
and "distance themselves verbally from the socialist sys­
tem and question its achievements."14 A survey of 
Gdansk high school students in 1984 found only 2 percent 
declaring themselves Marxists; and support is not much 
higher among university students. 15 Only II percent of 
Polish United Workers' party members are less than 30 
years old, the lowest percentage in the party's history. 
The party also suffers from a steady decline in mem­
bership (from 3.1 million in 1980 to only 2.1 million in 
mid-1985). . 
There are grimmer aspects to Polish society. According 
to official sources, alcoholism, drug abuse and crime 
(including violent crime) are on the increase, and the 
visitor to Poland is struck by the number ofdrunks and 
drug addicts encountered in the streets, many of them 
young people. This and the attendant alienation and 
frustration have led two Polish sociologists to describe 
their country as "a pulverized society."16 
THE UNDERGROUND 
Underground activity remains widespread in Poland, 
but Solidarity activists have almost the same difficulty as 
the regime in penetrating the pervasive apathy and pas­
sivity. As one underground publication argues, "society is 
not with us, nor is it with the authorities-it is keeping to 
12Slowo POdJ:.iemM, op. cit. 
13Cited in RfER, February 15, 1985. 
IfGlos S~c~tdllSki,July 2, 1984. 
upolitylci1, August 11, 1984. In the 1970's, similar surveys in 
different cities found 10 percent or more ofyoung people iden­
tifying themselves as Marxists. 
16Kostecki and Mrela, op. cit., p. 135. 
17Mysli NtinttmowaM, January-February 1984; translated in 
RfER, "Polish Samizdat Excerpts," July 6, 1984. Italics in 
original. 
'8See his article in the leading underground weekly Tygodnik 
Ma~ows~t, March 22, 1984; translated in RFER, "Polish 
Samizdal Excerpts," September 7, 1984. 
it.self."·7 There are probably tens of thousands of people 
involved in various kinds of underground activity, but 
most of this is local and decentralized. The "underground 
society" penneates the country, but it is not controlled by 
the persecuted and divided Solidarity leadership. 
In the early months of martial law, the underground 
TKK was able to organize major national demonstra­
tions against the government. But harassment by the 
police and ZOMO and the fatigue ofSolidarity support­
ers eventually cut down the size of these demonstrations. 
Of the seven initial members of the TKK, all but Zbig­
niew Bujak have either surrendered or have been appre­
hended (although each of them has been replaced by 
someone else on the TKK). The July, 1984, amnesty 
added to the ranks of the "above-ground" Solidarity 
leadership, fonnally led by Lech Walesa. While most 
Solidarity leaders have apparently met with Walesa on 
an individual basis, there have been few group meetings. 
A meeting was held in September, 1984, atJasna Gora 
Monastery in Czestochowa, but another meeting in 
February, 1985, was broken up by police and led to long 
prison terms for three of the participants. The authorities 
continue to harass Walesa and restrict his movements, 
and refer to him as a "private person" and "the fonner 
leader of a fonner trade union." 
Walesa nevertheless remains a popular figure in Po* 
land, his reputation enhanced by the 1983 Nobel Peace 
Prize. He continues to make cautious statements to West­
ern reporters and the underground press about the future 
ofthe movement and the country. He has argued in favor 
of carving out "relatively independent fields" of activity, 
including participation in the employees self-manage­
ment councils in enterprises. IS In fact, self-management 
has become the major focus for the national Solidarity 
leaders, who contend that the self-management councils, 
with sufficient participation from Solidarity supporters, 
can effect positive changes. Partly because ofSolidarity'S 
increasing interest, the regime has tried to fortify the new 
trade unions, which often compete with the self-manage­
ment bodies in the workplace. 
Most large enterprises have underground Solidarity 
structures to which, on average, one-fifth ofthe work force 
continues to pay monthly dues. Local Solidarity activities 
focus on providing financial aid to those persecuted by the 
authorities and the printing and distribution ofSolidarity 
bulletins and other underground publications. This 
samidat has reached unprecedented dimensions, with as 
many as 2,000 regular publications. Some of these are 
simply 1- or 2-page bulletins (some of which are printed 
in tens of thousano; ofcopies), but illegal publishers also 
produce 5OO-page books and, more recently, they have 
begun a line ofcontraband videotapes for the burgeoning 
VCR (videocassette recorder) market. 19 
This "second economy" in the mass media is an impor­
tant source ofinformation for Poles. Moreover, the official 
media, in competition with the unofficial, is forced to be 
more open and interesting and to address controversial 
issues. The result is that Poland, despite censorship, has 
the liveliest press in the Soviet bloc. 
THECHURCH 
While popular support for the Solidarity underground 
has diminished, the popularity of the Roman Catholic 
Church has grown. According to both official and unoffi­
19See Teresa Hanicka, "Underground Publications in Po­
land," RFER, "Background Report," July 26, 1984. 
2OFor details and analysis of the Popieluszko affair, secJane 
Cave, "The MurderofFather Popieluszko," Po/aruJ Watch, no. 7 
(1985), and David Ost, "Now Solidarity Has a Martyr," 1M 
Nation, March 2, 1985, pp. 237-240. 
..
 
cia! public opinion polls, it is the most trusted and popu­
lar institution in the country. The Church hierarchy, and 
particularly Archbishop JozefGlemp, the Primate of Po­
land, have lost some favor with staunch Solidarity sup­
porters, who often complain of the Church's lack ofdirect 
support for the underground movement. But for most 
Poles, the Church is the main moral and political repre­
sentative of the people, and perhaps the main outlet for 
creative and autonomous activity. 
Since the imposition of martial law, Glemp has pur­
sued a low-key and conciliatory policy, attempting, above 
all, to prevent societal or regime violence and to maintain 
and enlarge the Church's sphere of autonomy and activ­
ity. Until 1984, this strategy seemed to work, with rela­
tively good relations between Church and state. TheJoint 
Government-Episcopal Commission met regularly, and 
progress was reported on a number ofkey Church issues: 
the formalization of the legal status of the Church; the 
granting of permits to build new churches; and the de­
velopment of the Church-sponsored agricultural fund, 
which is to raise funds abroad for the development of 
private agriculture in Poland. There were points of ten­
sion, for example, over the attempts by local authorities to 
remove crucifixes from school classrooms, but these con­
flicts were usually settled through compromise. 
A turning point came in October, 1984, with the ab­
duction and murder of the outspoken pro-Solidarity 
priest, Father Jerzy Popieluszko, by four officers of the 
security police. Popieluszko's funeral on November 3, 
presided over by Archbishop Glemp, attracted some 
250,000 mourners. 
TheJaruzeiski government, at first apparently uncer­
tain how to handle the situation, finally decided to allow a 
fOrmal investigation ofthe incident. On December 27, the 
trial of the four security officers began in the city of 
Torun.20 The trial was yet another Polish paradox: the 
Polish state was publicly trying members of its own inter­
nal security forces. The trial lasted more than a month, 
and was covered extensively by the mass media, includ­
ing Polish television. During the trial, the chief govern­
ment prosecutor frequently referred to Popieluszko's "ex­
tremism" as a cause ofhis death. Nevertheless, on Febru­
ary 7, 1985, all four officers were sentenced to prison 
terms ranging from 14 to 25 years. 
The murder and the trial had a number of important 
consequences. First, it gave Poland a universal martyr. 
"Father Jerzy" symbolized the conflict between the 
Church and the Polish state, the unity of the Church and 
Polish society and, for many, the irreconcilability of the 
Catholic society and the Communist regime. Buttons, 
pictures and postcards of Popieluszko are in churches 
everywhere, and his church and burial site, Saint Stanis­
law Kostka in Warsaw, has become a virtual shrine, with 
a constant stream of visitors and pilgrims. 
The murder and trial also soured relations between the 
Church and the state. The trial led the Polish Episcopate 
to me a formal complaint against Polish radio and televi­
sion for manipulating trial information in an attempt to 
discredit the Church. But media attacks on the Church 
have continued, including an unprecedented attack on 
the Pope himself.21 In June, 1985, two priests were con­
victed after a one-day trial for "organizing and leading an 
illegal protest" over the removal of crosses from class­
rooms in the town of Wloszczowa.22 Shortly thereafter, 
Jaruzelski and Glemp met for the first time sinceJanuary, 
1984, but the joint communique following the meeting 
suggested little progress in church-state relations. 
TJiE ECONOMY 
The regime claims that the major problem facing 
Poland is economic, not political, and many Poles agree. 
After four straight years of economic decline (1979­
1982), the economy has finally begun to grow again; 
national income rose about 6 percent in both 1983 and 
1984. Still, national income has not yet recovered to 1978 
levels, and in some areas (e.g., livestock) production is 
less than it was in the 1960's. Poles have suffered through 
six years of shortages, rationing, queuing and inflation. 
The cost of living increased 357 percent from 1980 to 
1984, and three rounds of price increases in 1985 are 
expected to add another 3 percent over 1984.23 In the 
past, food price increases have been met with strikes and 
demonstrations, but the recent increases have elicited 
little public response. Many Poles rely on the enormous 
"second economy" to satisfy household needs; for exam­
ple, obtaining scarce medicines through friends who work 
in a hospital;. purchasing meat (which is still rationed) 
from the "veal lady" who brings it door-to-door from the 
countryside; buying clothes in the unofficial but legal 
markets in almost any big city. 
Poland faces a host of other economic problems: low 
levels of productivity, declining quality in manufactured 
goods, an outdated capital stock, a huge international 
debt, and economic sanctions and credit restrictions from 
the West. The debt has continued to grow and now 
amounts to $26.8 billion to Western countries and 4.8 
billion rubles to socialist countries. Partly because of 
Western sanctions, Poland has reoriented its trade to­
ward the socialist bloc, making it that much more difficult 
to earn the hard currency necessary to repay the Western 
debts. The credit crunch may be easing somewhat, 
however; most United States sanctions were lifted in 
response to the July, 1984, amnesty, and Poland's 17 
Western creditor countries (the "Paris Club") agreed in 
July, 1985, to reschedule much of Poland's debt repay­
ment. 
These problems have complicated the regime's efforts 
to implement economic reform. Developed during 1981, 
21 Politylca, March 3D, 1985. 
22RFER, "Polish Situation Report.," June 26, 1985. 
23Maly RocQIik Sla!>,s~QlJ /985 (Warsaw: Glowny Urzad 
Statystyczny, 1985). 
24gee Stanislaw Gomulka and Jacek Rostowski, "The Re­
formed Polish Economic System," Sovitt Sbulin, vol. 36 (1984), 
pp.386-405. 
the reform plan is similar to the Hungarian New Eco­
nomic Mechanism; it allows a greater role for the market 
and increased autonomy for enterprises, and it sharply 
reduces central controls and planning.24 The political 
restrictions of martial law and the economic crisis have 
restricted the reform plan; most Polish economists admit 
the lack ofpositive results so far. The economic problem is 
compounded by the political one; the decentralizing re­
form depends on cooperation and hard work from a labor 
force that is sullen and withdrawn. 
Nevertheless, the 1983 and 1984 increases in national 
income and gross industrial output are signs of an eco­
nomic recovery. Nineteen eighty-four set a record for 
hard coal exports, an important source of foreign ex­
change for Poland. The agricultural harvests have been 
good for the last three years because of both favorable 
weather and a greatly increased share of government 
investment in private farms. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Jaruzelski regime claims to have achieved a de­
gree of stability and "normalization" since 1981, but it 
has not been able to achieve political legitimacy. The 
issues of democracy, political participation, and justice 
raised by Solidarity have not been resolved and continue 
to haunt the government. At the same time, Solidarity is 
unable to mount protests large enough to threaten the 
regime or force it to be more accommodating. 
While Solidarity has been driven underground, its spir­
it lives on; the experience of 1980-1981 is now a perma­
nent feature of the Polish national consciousness. Given 
Poland's history ofrebellion-the years 1956, 1968, 1970, 
1976, 1980 have become almost a litany-there will prob­
ably be trouble again. The underground movement is 
biding its time, educating itself, studying the mistakes of 
the past, debating long-term strategy, and attempting to 
build an "underground society." "'hen the time comes, 
this opposition will be a much more organized, disci­
plined and potent force than it was in 1980. But it will still 
have to deal with Poland's "geopolitical realities" and 
decide how to achieve greater measures ofdemocracy and 
independence without threatening the leading role of the 
party and Poland's alliance with the Soviet Union. 
In 1985, most Poles do not want to address such issues 
and have turned their attention to family and Church. 
The regime has capitalized on the apathy and divisions 
within society and the primacy ofmateriaI and economic 
concerns. The authorities hope to regain political legiti­
macy through economic growth and a gradual improve­
ment in the standard ofliving. Given Poland's economic 
problems, this is a difficult task. But the authorities must 
reckon with the axiom that revolutions occur not when 
things are at their worst, when people have neither the 
time nor energy for political activity, but when the situa­
tion is improving. Like the opposition, the authorities will 
also face a dilemma: how to expand political participation 
and control it without provoking a revolution. 
